The procedure and effectiveness of structural litigation: the “strong” and “weak” models of judicial intervention in public policy

Abstract

This research aims to analyze the judicial procedure adopted in structural litigation, with the aim of identifying and differentiating the “weak” and “strong” intensities of judicial intervention in public policies. The subject is of great importance in the current context of constitutional jurisdiction and administrative law, insofar as it offers our possibilities with regard to the control of public administration, especially with regard to the judicial control of public policies. Deepening the theoretical construction of structural litigation is crucial to improving relations between the branches of government, consolidating democracy, and making more effective the judicial decisions that relate to public policies necessary for the protection of fundamental rights. Knowing whether and how the judiciary should adopt a solution using the technique of structural litigation is a matter for in-depth reflection. The research is bibliographical and qualitative, adopting a descriptive methodology in terms of its objectives.